The GCLC held today its 11th lunch talk. Sven Voelcker (from Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr) and Anthony Whelan (from the Legal Service of the European Commission) discussed the Tetra Laval case (see link at the end of this post for S. Voelcker's slides). A question however remains: is there really a point in controlling ex ante the risk of leveraging (i) when this is based on controversial economic theory (and the risk of false positives is consequently high); (ii) where the foreseen anticompetitive conduct is only expected to take place in the mid-long run; and (iii) where an appropriate ex post legal instrument exists (article 82 EC) and could be used when/if the anticompetitive effect occurs? A similar question could be raised with respect to oligopolistic coordination/collective dominance. This probably explains why the ECJ held that the onus of proof bearing on the Commission in leverage and in collective dominance cases was similar (see §40 of the judgment).